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Abstract
The effects of training on own and co-worker productivity: evidence from a field 
experiment**
This paper analyses the effects of work-related training on worker productivity. To 
identify the causal effects from training, we combine a field experiment that randomly 
assigns workers to treatment and control groups with panel data on individual worker 
performance before and after training. We find that participation in the training 
programme leads to a 10 percent increase in performance. Moreover, we provide 
experimental evidence for externalities from treated workers on their untreated 
teammates: An increase of 10 percentage points in the share of treated peers leads to a 
performance increase of 0.51 percent. We provide evidence that the estimated effects 
are causal and not the result of employee selection into and out of training. Furthermore, 
we find that the performance increase is not due to lower quality provided by the worker.
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1 Introduction
Estimating the returns of work-related training on productivity is a challenge for two
reasons. First, the non-random selection of workers into training makes it difficult to
identify the causal effect of training participation on individual productivity from other
unobservable factors that drive participation in training as well as productivity. If this
selection is not appropriately accounted for, the causal impact of training programmes on
productivity can be overestimated (Bassanini et al. 2007). Second, it is difficult to find
appropriate proxy variables for productivity. While wages are often used to estimate re-
turns to training participation, the returns of employer-provided training on productivity
should be higher than those on wages (Dearden et al. 2006); however, direct measures of
productivity at the individual level are scarce.
Our contribution to the literature is twofold: We are the first to provide experi-
mental evidence on (1) the causal effects of investments in training on productivity using
individual performance information and (2) the externalities of training on co-worker
productivity. A randomised field experiment enables us to measure the causal effects of
investments in training on worker productivity. The field experiment was carried out in
the call centre of a multinational telephone company in the Netherlands. We have detailed
information on the contents, length, and purpose of the training programme, as well as
unique panel data with administrative information on individual performance, to estimate
the returns to training. Agents were randomly assigned to treatment and control groups.
This exogenous variation in training participation is used to estimate the returns that
are causally related to training and not to unobservable factors affecting both training
participation and productivity. We find that agents perform 10 percent better after par-
ticipating in the training programme than non-treated agents. We show that this effect
is causal and not the result of employee selection into and out of training. Furthermore,
we find that the performance increase is not due to a lower quality of work.
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Workers belonging to the treatment group were trained over successive weeks. More-
over, due to the restricted capacity of the training centre the teams had to be split into
two training groups. This time-varying treatment of the agents in a team allows for the
further random assignment of agents into a first and a second training group. This en-
ables us to identify possible externalities from training on untreated peers within a team.
We find that a 10 percentage point increase in the share of treated agents leads to a
performance increase of 0.51 percent for their untreated teammates.
From a policy point of view, an unbiased estimation of the impact of training on
productivity is important for assessing the role of further training in the development of
human capital. Previous studies have found rather mixed results, mostly depending on the
method applied, as well as the measure of productivity used. We therefore categorise the
research into three main strands. A large number of studies focus on the wage effects of
work-related training and are extensively surveyed in Bartel (2000), Dearden et al. (2006),
and Bassanini et al. (2007). After correcting for selectivity by applying fixed-effects
estimation or instrumental variables regressions, these studies find returns of training
ranging from zero (Goux and Maurin 2000) to 10 percent (Parent 2003). The disadvantage
of using wages to measure the effects of training, however, is that wage increases after
training only reflect the returns to the worker. The effect on productivity is thus likely
to be underestimated under rent sharing.
The second strand of research uses large-scale surveys across firms, establishments,
or industries. As a measure of firm productivity, most of these studies use the value
added or sales of firms (Black and Lynch 2001; Dearden et al. 2006; Zwick 2006; Konings
and Vanormelingen 2010) or direct measures of productivity within one sector of industry
(Holzer et al. 1993). Both Dearden et al. (2006) and Konings and Vanormelingen (2010)
show that the effects of training on firm productivity are about twice those on worker
wages. When controlling for various sources of worker heterogeneity, the latter authors
find that the productivity premium for a trained employee is, on average, 17 percent.
Though large-scale surveys can have the advantage of providing a representative sample
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for one or more sectors of industry, they inherently suffer from unobservable heterogeneity
in the type as well as duration of training programmes and firm production processes
(Ichniowski and Shaw 2009). Moreover, it is difficult, if not impossible, to find direct
measures of productivity that are comparable across industries.
The third strand of research on the effects of training on productivity focuses on just
a single firm or establishment, or comparable establishments within a sector of industry
(Bartel 1995; Krueger and Rouse 1998; Liu and Batt 2007). Using direct performance
measures and wages, they find mostly positive effects of training.
Overall, previous studies have estimated a range of treatment effects of training
participation on productivity. At the same time, there is consensus that appropriate
correction for selection into training matters for estimation. Although the use of field
experiments has sharply increased over the last decade, only a few studies in the human
capital literature exploit (quasi-) exogenous variations in training participation to estimate
the effects of training. Leuven and Oosterbeek (2008) use information on the reasons for
non-participation to artificially create treatment and control groups and find no significant
effects from participation in training. The authors conclude that the usual methods to
correct for selection into training do still overestimate the true effect of training. Similarly,
Schwerdt et al. (2011) find no significant effects in their study analysing the effect of
randomly assigned government-funded training vouchers.
This study exploits random assignment to training by means of a field experiment
to overcome selectivity in training participation. By randomly assigning agents to treat-
ment and control groups, we can estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) of training
participation on individual productivity. We use panel data on individual worker pro-
ductivity to estimate the effects of the training programme. To measure productivity,
we use the key performance indicator used by the call centre to evaluate its call agents,
that is, the average time needed to handle inbound customer calls. This performance
measure has also been used in other studies in the call centre sector (Liu and Batt 2007;
Breuer et al. 2010). We measure each worker’s performance each week before and after
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the training, which allows us to analyse short-run performance dynamics in the weeks
after training. Using individual productivity as an outcome allows us to capture the total
effect of training on productivity, while wage information captures only the share an agent
receives.1
Despite a growing literature on peer effects in the workplace, the externalities of
training have hardly been discussed in the literature on the impact of training on pro-
ductivity.2 The literature on human capital externalities originates from growth theory
and has been applied to human capital spillover effects from workers’ level of education
(Moretti 2004). When the returns to training are estimated at the individual (worker)
level without taking knowledge spillovers into account, returns will be underestimated.
This also holds for a second type of externalities, peer effects due to social pressure (Falk
and Ichino 2006). The identification of externalities, however, is empirically difficult. Pre-
vious studies used either quasi-random variations in group composition (Mas and Moretti
2009; De Grip et al. 2011) or the random assignment of subjects to groups (Guryan et al.
2009). While many field experiments have exploited changes in management behaviour
induced by firm management (e.g., Shaw and Lazear 2008; Bandiera et al. 2007), we
exploit the structure of the field experiment to estimate externalities. To achieve iden-
tification, teams were randomly split into two training groups. This random assignment
of agents from the same team allows us to estimate the causal estimates of within-team
externalities.
The training we analyse was a one-week course to train call agents in conversation
techniques designed to decrease the average handling time of calls while maintaining call
quality. Call centres have become a major sector of employment due to strong growth
rates since the 1980s, facilitated by the increasing availability of information and com-
1A second advantage of using individual productivity instead of annual productivity data is that
studies using annual data are more likely to underestimate the causal effects of training. If the yearly
data do not contain information on the training period and use average productivity over the previous
year, the returns to training are likely to be underestimated, even if selectivity is properly controlled for.
2To the best of our knowledge, the only exception is the study of Dearden et al. (2006) who aim to
estimate externalities by comparing individual-level wage regressions with industry-level wage regressions
that should capture externalities.
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munication technology infrastructure. For the US, Batt et al. (2005) estimate that call
centres employed about 4 million employees, roughly 3 percent of the total workforce. Al-
though the current trend is to outsource call centres, most call centres are in-house (Batt
et al. 2009). Work-related training is an important element of the call centre industry. In
general, call agents receive hardly any initial vocational training, whereas the heavy use
of information technology in in-house centres requires high investments in work-related
training. From this perspective, we expect the returns on training in call centres will be
high (Sieben et al. 2009).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: Section 2 provides an overview
of the firm analysed in this paper and its workers and describes the experiment in detail.
Section 3 presents our regression model and the estimation results. Additional evidence
and tests on the robustness of our results are discussed in Section 4. Finally, Section 5
summarises the paper and presents concluding remarks.
2 Context of the experiment
2.1 Organisation of the department and worker tasks
The field experiment analysed in this paper was implemented in an in-house call centre
of a multinational mobile network operator in the Netherlands. The call centre acts as a
service centre for current and prospective customers. It has five departments segmented
by customer group. To ensure a homogeneous production process, we focus on the largest
department, that for private customers with fixed cell phone contracts.
The main task of call agents in this department is to answer customer phone calls.
Customers contact customer service when they have problems, complaints, or questions.
All agents take part in a training course when entering the department that enables them
to handle basic types of calls. Throughout their careers, agents receive further train-
ing. These training programmes mainly focus on information in promotional campaigns,
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communication, and information technology skills, as well as on handling more complex
calls.
In the first period of our sample, 179 individuals were working in the department.
Column (1) of Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of all agents working in the depart-
ment at the beginning of the period of observation. Most agents are part-timers. The
average number of hours worked per week is 18.0, and only 22.4 percent of agents work
25 hours or more each week. A total of 29.1 percent of all agents are men, the average
age of the agents is 32.6 years, and the agents have an average of 2.7 years of experience
working for the firm.
– Table 1 about here –
The agents are organised into 10 teams. In general, all teams provide all services, that
is, there is no team specialisation in handling certain types of calls or customers. All teams
work on the same floor of the building. Work places are organised into work islands, with
up to eight agents of a team sitting next to each other. Each team is led by a team leader
who reports to the head of the department. The team leaders’ main task is supervising
and monitoring the agents of their team. They evaluate their agents regularly based on
performance scorecards containing detailed information on key performance indicators.
Agent pay is based on a single collective agreement. Agents are paid a base wage and
receive an annual wage raise of zero to 8 percent, depending on an annual performance
rating by the team leader. There are no other individual or team-related bonuses.
2.2 Training purpose, contents, and organisation
The training programme analysed in this study was intended for all agents of the depart-
ment with some experience on the job. Its aim was to increase the efficiency of agents
answering customer calls. Agents who were recently recruited were not selected for this
6
training (yet). The management had decided to organise the training to decrease the av-
erage time needed for handling calls, because the call centre had been performing below
the targets set.
The training was organised as a week-long programme. Due to capacity constraints,
only one group, with a maximum of 10 agents, could be trained at a time. The training
took place in an in-house training centre located on a different floor in the same build-
ing. The programme consisted of 10 half-day training sessions that were held on five
consecutive days, from Monday to Friday. In half of these sessions, agents were either
formally trained by a coach or had group discussions assisted by a coach and their team
leader. In these group discussions, agents discussed the skills they lacked, how their skills
could be improved, and how agents could help each other on the work floor. In formal
sessions, agents were trained in conversation techniques designed to decrease the average
time needed for handling customer calls without lowering quality. This included, for in-
stance, the way in which call agents gathered information from customers to resolve calls
quickly.
The remaining sessions consisted of learning by doing, by either handling regular
customer calls or listening to the calls of other call agents. During these sessions, incoming
customer calls were routed to the training centre and agents handled these calls under
the supervision of the training coach and their team leader.
2.3 The field experiment
In the economic literature on estimating the effects of training, the most evident problem
is the potential correlation of unobservable factors with both training participation and
the outcome variable. This study uses exogenous variations in training participation to
identify the causal effect of training on individual productivity.
As shown in Figure 1, the field experiment consists of three periods. We observe 32
weeks, from week 45/2008 through week 24/2009. At the beginning of the first period
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(pre-experiment), which lasted 17 weeks, agents were assigned to treatment and control
groups. In this period, neither the treatment group agents nor the control group agents
were trained. During the second, experiment period, the treatment group was trained
consecutively over five weeks. After the experiment period (post-experiment, lasting
10 weeks), agents from the treatment group as well as their untreated peers from the
control group worked as usual. Because the agents of the control groups were trained
after the post-experiment period (from week 25/2009 onwards), we use data from week
45/2008 through week 24/2009 only. Agents who are part of the control group thus never
participate in training throughout our observation period.
– Figure 1 about here –
The training had been designed for agents with some experience in the job. Out of
the 179 individuals working in the department at the beginning of our observation period
(week 50/2008), 86 were selected for the training.3 Management focused the training pro-
gramme on the more tenured agents for two reasons: First, agents should be experienced
to benefit from this type of training and, second, management was aiming to lower the
risk of losing its training investments through turnover.
Column (4) of Table 1 shows the differences between assigned and non-assigned
agents. Assigned agents are an average of six years older, have longer tenure by more
than three years, and perform better. While this selection is clearly non-random, it does
not violate the assumption that assignment to the treatment group is exogenous. This
is because assignment to the treatment and control groups is exogenous conditional on
being assigned to the training programme. An advantage of the focus on more experienced
agents is that the calls they handle are relatively homogeneous: Agents with longer tenure
deal with all types of calls, whereas starting agents do not work on all types of calls yet.
3Agents not selected initially were assigned to training weeks after the training of the treatment group.
Because these agents could not be randomly assigned to treatment and control groups, we do not consider
them to be part of the control group. The effects we find therefore only hold for more experienced agents.
As Sieben et al. (2009) show, training courses for more experienced agents are highly relevant in the call
centre sector.
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Conditional on being selected for the training programme, 37 of the 86 agents were
randomly selected for participation in the treatment group. The remaining 49 agents,
who were assigned to the control group, were trained after the post-experiment period,
that is, after the end of the observation period. The differences in observable character-
istics between the assigned treatment and control groups are relatively small, with none
significantly different from zero (Column (7) of Table 1). For the estimation, however,
agents were excluded if the management reassigned them from the control group to the
treatment group, or vice versa, because they could not participate in the planned training
week due to vacation or illness. Three agents from the treatment group and nine agents
from the control group are thus excluded from the estimation sample. Column (10) of
Table 1 shows that there is no statistical difference in observable variables between the
treatment and control groups of our estimation sample.4 The resulting estimation sample
is an unbalanced panel of 74 agents during 32 weeks. In total, we have 1,859 agent-week
observations on performance. On average, agents work 28 weeks out of the 32 weeks. The
time-variant treatment in our experiment implies that the treatment and control groups
differ during each specific week, that is, agents belong to the control group until they are
treated. For this reason, teams were not only randomly assigned to the treatment and
control groups, but also randomly assigned to the various weeks during the treatment
period.
Identification of externalities
Although agents carry out individual tasks, social interactions can arise, influencing
the treatment effect.5 Agents belonging to the same team sit next to each other. Fur-
thermore, they can communicate with their co-workers during team meetings and breaks.
4In addition, all tests were conducted by using the non-parametric Wilcoxon-rank test, which is suited
for comparing discrete measures between small groups (Wilcoxon 1945). The results do not differ from
those of the two-sided t-test.
5The production technology, however, is not necessarily without externalities. Agents may follow a
strategy of providing low quality to score well on the main performance criteria (average handling time).
If low-quality calls lead to a higher rate of customers calling repeatedly, other agents can be affected if they
have to take more care of those customers. In practice, however, agents cannot easily shirk by providing
low quality with a low average handling time because the quality of agents is regularly monitored by
their team leaders, who can listen in on the calls. Moreover, if there was any shirking by providing low
quality, these agents should be similarly distributed to the treatment and control groups.
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In a survey held among the agents, 80 percent stated that they exchange work-related
information either during official team meetings or at their workplace. Therefore, the
likelihood of externalities is higher within teams than across teams. We do not preclude
externalities between teams; however, given the physical distance on the work floor, these
externalities should be less than externalities within teams.
Our field experiment allows us to identify these externalities of the training on un-
treated peers. For this purpose, we exploit the fact that eight of the 10 teams had to be
split into separate training groups to match the size restriction of training groups in the
firm’s training centre, and the agents in these teams were randomly assigned to the two
training groups.
Divided teams can thus be distinguished in the first and second training groups. In
between the training weeks of the two training groups in which a team had been split, one
or two groups of a different team were trained. During these weeks, the team consisted of
exogenously chosen agents who were treated and randomly chosen agents who were not
yet treated. This further randomisation enables us to distinguish between three groups of
agents: (1) those who were trained first (first training group), (2) their teammates who
were trained later (second training group), and (3) the agents in the teams in the original
control group who will not be trained in the period we analyse. We exploit the fact that
the agents of one team were randomly assigned to training groups to identify within-team
externalities. Table 2 shows the means of observable characteristics for treatment group
agents in a team’s first training group (N=13) versus the means for agents who are in a
team’s second training group (N=21).6
– Table 2 about here –
All agents were informed about the training at the moment of their initial assign-
ment. Throughout the experiment, information about the randomisation of the order of
6Both the t-test as well as the Wilcoxon-rank test do not show significant differences between the
groups. It should be noted, however, that the sample size for this comparison is rather small.
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the teams was given only to the head of the training department and the department
manager. No information was given to the team leaders or the agents about the randomi-
sation or the evaluation of the training programme. There was no need to do this, since
all employees know that the size of the training centre is restricted. For this reason the
training department always makes a training schedule in collaboration with the depart-
ment managers when they start a new training program. The training centre is occupied
most of the time. During the post-experiment period, agents from other departments of
the call centre were trained in the training centre.
2.4 Measuring productivity
We measure agent productivity by means of the call centre’s key performance indicator:
the average handling time, defined as the average time an agent needs to handle a customer
call (Liu and Batt 2007, Breuer et al. 2010). The handling time includes the time needed
to talk to the customer, as well as the time needed to log the call in the customer database.
Information on the average handling time of each individual agent i is available for each
working week t. This performance measure does not contain information on the quality
of calls. Section 4.3 introduces additional indicators of call quality and discusses the
quality-quantity relation.
The department’s aim is to improve performance by decreasing average handling
time. Throughout this study, we therefore use the inverse of the average handling time
(ahtit) multiplied by 100: yit =
1
ahtit
· 100. Since lower values of ahtit are interpreted
as higher performance, this transformation allows us to interpret improvements in yit as
increases in individual productivity. The average performance of all agents assigned to
training is 0.3307, which relates to 5.6 minutes for an average call (see Column (1) of
Table 1).
There is substantial heterogeneity in individual performance within and between
agents. This suggests that not only individual-specific characteristics, but also other,
department-specific effects such as technical problems affect the individual productivity
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of all agents working in the department. Compared to individual heterogeneity in produc-
tivity, however, variation over time is less important: While period fixed effects explain
only about 12 percent of the overall variation in individual performance, worker fixed
effects alone explain 43 percent of the overall variation in performance.
It is essential that our measure of productivity is comparable within and between
agents. Calls are randomly assigned to agents. Agents have no direct influence on the
types of calls they receive or the types of customers put through to them, and, therefore
have the same probability of exceptionally long or short calls. Before talking to agents,
however, customers must first state the purpose of their call. Based on this information,
calls are routed to agents who have sufficient knowledge to resolve the call. The assign-
ments of agents to types of calls can be changed at any time by management. Agents are
often reassigned ad hoc if the structure of customer calls changes.
This assignment of calls to agents does not violate the assumption that our per-
formance measure is comparable across time and agents. First, because agents are ex-
ogenously assigned to the treatment and control groups, the skill distribution of agents
and thus the types of calls should, on average, be the same in the treatment and con-
trol groups. Second, we compare an agent’s performance before and after the training
intervention. Because the training did not focus on resolving different types of customer
requests, calls assigned to agents after the treatment do not systematically differ from
those assigned prior to the training.
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3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Causal effect of training on individual performance
We observe an agent i’s performance yi and training participation di. The observed
outcome can thus be written as
yi = yi(di) = di · yi(1) + (1− di) · yi(0) (1)
where yi(1) and yi(0) denote performance in the treated and untreated states, respectively.
The randomised assignment of agents to the treatment and control groups ensures the
independence of treatment status and potential outcomes E[yi(j)|di = 0] = E[yi(j)|di = 1]
for j = 0, 1. The ATE τ (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983) is thus identified by τ = E[yi(1)−
yi(0)]. The ATE can be estimated by performing a linear regression of individual i’s
performance yit in week t on a treatment dummy dit, which is defined as being one in
each after-training period, and zero otherwise:
yit =αi + τdit + β1tt + β2Xit + β3Xt + uit (2)
where αi are individual fixed effects to account for individual heterogeneity remaining
despite the experimental design, andXit are covariates that are assumed to be independent
from the treatment status dit, such as working hours in week t and the type of shift the
agent is working.7 The variable tt is a linear time trend that controls for trends in
aggregate performance affecting all agents, and uit is an idiosyncratic error term. To
control for aggregate effects on performance (Xt), we include the overall number of calls
7We do not use agent tenure as a covariate in our regressions for two reasons. First, because the
agents in our sample are all relatively experienced, there is not sufficient variation in individual tenure to
control for tenure and for common time trends. Second, previous research shows that experience effects
matter only for new agents (De Grip et al. 2011).
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divided by the total number of full-time equivalent agents. Throughout this analysis,
standard errors are clustered at the agent level.8
3.2 Baseline results
We provide first evidence of the treatment effect in Figure 2, which shows the average
performance of agents in the treatment group. The treatment week is denoted week 0,
with positive (negative) values of the x axis showing the tth calendar week after (before)
the training. Agent performance appears to be, on average, higher in the weeks after
the training than before the training. When the performance of untreated agents is not
controlled for, treated agents perform significantly better after the training. Given the
random assignment of agents to the treatment and control groups, this can also be shown
by comparing the mean performance of agents in the treatment group with that of agents
in the control group. Table 3 shows that agents in the treatment group are significantly
more productive after the training, while there are no significant pre-treatment differences
between the two groups.
– Table 3 about here –
– Figure 2 about here –
Table 4 shows the results when estimating Equation (2). The treatment dummy is
defined as being one in all weeks after an agent has been trained, and zero otherwise.
While agents from the control group thus always have a treatment dummy equal to zero,
the share of treated agents increases in time with the growing number of groups that have
been trained. Column (1) of Table 4 shows that agent performance after participation
in the training is 11.3 percent higher than before the training, controlling for untreated
8In panels increasing in T with fixed N , the appropriate assumptions about standard errors can be
crucial to the significance of the results (Bertrand et al. 2004). The results here were re-estimated,
allowing for serial correlation in the standard errors. This does not change the size or significance of the
results.
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agents’ performance. When, in addition, individual heterogeneity is controlled for by
including worker fixed effects, the effect increases slightly to 12.4 percent (Column 2).
Figure 2, however, suggests that aggregate trends matter. When controlling for a linear
time trend, the effect decreases by about 3.6 percent to an estimated effect of 8.8 percent
(Column 3 of Table 4).9 The time trend itself is significant, suggesting that there is an
overall positive trend in performance during the sample period.
– Table 4 about here –
The estimates in Column (3) of Table 4 show that the number of working hours
do not have a significant impact on the performance yit. In order to control for possible
differences in the nature and amount of calls during peak hours, we use a variable that
contains the share of peak hours in the total number of hours agent i worked in week t.
The estimates show that a 10 percentage-point increase in the share of peak hours leads
to a decrease in performance of 3.4 percent. This suggests that the calls during peak
hours are more time consuming than the calls at other times of the day.10 In order to
control for overall pressure in week t, we furthermore control for the effect of the overall
number of incoming calls in week t, divided by the number of full-time equivalent agents.
This variable, however, does not significantly affect the performance of agents.
The preceding analysis makes the standard assumption that participation in training
leads to a persistent shift in performance by including a dummy for participation in
training. Given the weekly performance information at hand, we can exploit dynamic
patterns of the treatment effect. Figure 3 shows the estimated shape of the treatment
effect in the weeks after the training. Panel (a) of Figure 3 is based on an estimation
of Equation (2) where the treatment variable dit has been replaced by a set of dummies
for each post-training week (
∑T
t′=1 dit′), where t
′ = 1 denotes the first week after the
9To allow for more flexibility in time trends common to all agents, we also estimated Equation (2)
including linear and squared time trends. The estimated treatment effect τˆ then decreases slightly. The
difference between the two estimates is not significantly different from zero.
10We also estimated regressions with similar variables to control for the timing of working hours, such
as dummies for different working hours. These estimates show very similar results.
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training. The untreated state dit = 0 serves as the reference. It shows that the increase in
performance in the first week after the training is not significantly different from zero. In
the weeks thereafter, agent performance is significantly higher than before the training.
Soon after, however, the estimated treatment effect gradually decreases and becomes
insignificant from about the eighth week after the training. This decrease suggests that
the estimate τˆ can only be interpreted as an average effect over the whole post-treatment
period.
– Figure 3 about here –
While this result seems to suggest that the treatment effect declines over time, there
may be other mechanisms at work. From a human capital perspective, it is less reasonable
that human capital acquired during the training depreciates within a short number of
weeks. Moreover, the declining treatment effect may be due to a decline in the agents’
motivation. From this perspective, however, it is difficult to understand that workers are
least productive in the first week after the training. When the treatment effect would be
driven by motivation, there should be a high positive performance effect in the first week.
It is more likely that the decreasing treatment effect is driven by training externalities. If
(yet) untreated agents are affected by the training of their peers, either due to knowledge
spillover or peer pressure, their performance will increase when their co-workers have been
treated. In this case, the treatment effect measured should be highest in the weeks shortly
after the training and then constantly diminish, because agents from the control group
are not actually fully untreated but indirectly affected by the training as well. Panel (b)
of Figure 3 takes account of possible training externalities by showing the estimated shape
of the treatment effects in the weeks after the training for the agents in the first training
groups only, with the agents who will not be trained throughout the observation period
as the control group. This figure shows a similar pattern as Panel (a). The treatment
effect, however, remains significant for a longer period. Both the treatment and control
groups in this setting are not affected by within-team externalities suggesting that Panel
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(a) exhibits contamination through externalities leading to a decreasing treatment effect
over time.
3.3 The role of social interaction
The preceding subsection estimates the ATE from participation in the training programme
in the way that is standard in the training literature. An unbiased estimate τˆ , however,
requires the stable unit treatment value assumption, hereafter SUTVA (Angrist et al.
1996). The most important implication of the SUTVA is that there are no externalities
from treated workers on untreated workers; that is, the control group’s performance (y(0))
is not affected by the treatment. In settings where individuals potentially interact, the
SUTVA is violated. In the presence of externalities on untreated agents, the observed
outcome changes to
yi = yi(di) = di · yi(1) + (1− di) · (1 + d∗i τs) · yi(0) (3)
where di, yi(0), and yi(1) are defined as in Equation (1). In addition, we allow the
observed performance in the untreated state to be affected by the treatment of workers
in the same team. The indicator d∗i is defined as being one if a worker is untreated but
exposed to treated workers from the same team. If an agent is untreated (di = 0) and
working in a team in which all agents are untreated (d∗i = 0), the potential outcome from
Equation (3) simplifies to that from Equation (1). The same holds for treated agents who
participated in the training (di = 1 and d
∗
i = 0). The indirect treatment effect τs scales
the size of the externality. If we assume that externalities are non-negative and affect
untrained agents only, Equation (3) implies that, unless τs = 0, the estimated treatment
effect (τˆ) is underestimated in Equation (2). If direct and indirect treatment effects are
stable, the true treatment effect is underestimated by τs.
In practice, the identification of social effects is cumbersome due to endogeneity
(Manski 1993). In our setting, however, we can exploit the fact that team agents were
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randomly assigned to two separate training groups. In between the training of two groups
belonging to the same team, treated and untreated agents of the same team worked
together for one or two weeks. During these weeks, a randomly selected group of the team
that was treated worked with the remainder of the team that was untreated. Untreated
agents of these teams were thus exposed to treated peers. Assuming that there are no
peer effects between teams, the random assignment enables us to identify within-team
externalities. We can do this in both a direct and an indirect way. The first column of
Table 5 shows the results of a direct test of externalities. Here, we test whether the share
of treated peers affects the performance of agents who were not yet treated. We therefore
use precise information about an individual agent’s shift to calculate the share of treated
agents among all the agents with whom the agent worked during that shift. The share
of treated peers is calculated for peers from the same team only. The results show that a
10 percent increase in the share of treated peers leads to a performance increase of 0.51
percent. This effect, however, is only statistically significant at the 10 percent level of
significance.11
– Table 5 about here –
The second training groups having already increased their productivity through the
externality effect of the first group being trained, we can expect a smaller additional effect
when the second training groups finally receive the training themselves. We therefore
test whether τˆ is lower for agents who were exposed to treated agents before their own
training. Column (2) of Table 5 shows the estimated treatment effect for agents who
comprise the first group of their team to be treated, compared to that for the control
group of agents who were in teams in which none of the agents were treated throughout
the observation period. The estimated effect is slightly higher (9.9 percent) than when
11The regression presented in Column (1) of Table 5 does not contain the variable share peak hours.
This is because both variables share of peers treated and share peak hours are based on the same hourly
information. This causes a high between-agent within week correlation of the two variables and makes it
impossible to identify the effect of share peak hours in this regression. This is supported by the fact that
agents have only limited possibilities to choose shifts, and that the assignment to the first and second
training group is random (Table 2).
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estimating Equation (2) for all agents (8.8 percent; see Column (3) of Table 4). This
suggests that the causal effect from training is underestimated because some agents were
exposed to treated agents in their teams. Accordingly, the same estimation for second-
group agents results in a lower estimate. Column (3) of Table 5 shows that their treatment
effect is 6.8 percent. The difference between the two estimates, however, is not significantly
different at the 5 percent significance level. Despite this, the results shown in Table 5
strongly suggest the existence of peer effects from treated agents on untreated peers in
their team.
3.4 Returns to training
Standard theory predicts that firms invest in human capital if the expected returns from
training investments exceed costs. Personnel information with specific information on the
length and costs of training, as well as information on performance, allows to estimate
the returns to training (Liu and Batt 2007). For the training analysed in this study, the
costs of training per agent are defined as
C =
(ng · wa + wl + wc) ∗ h
ng
(4)
where ng is the size of the training group; wa, wl, and wc are the hourly wages for the
agents, team leader, and training coach, respectively; and h is the length of the training
in hours.12 Because our performance measure is the time an agent needs, on average,
to handle a call, and there are no other tasks in which the agent is involved, benefits
are defined as the percentage increase in performance times the weekly workload and the
agent’s wage. The benefit Bd can be calculated for each week after the training d:
Bd = (τˆd · ahtid · nc,id) · wa (5)
12The wage costs of the team leader and training coach who supervise the training are included as
direct training costs.
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where nc,id is the number of calls an agent completes in after-training week d and τˆd is
the estimated treatment effect for this week as shown in Panel (b) of Figure 3. The term
Bd is thus the decrease in the time a trained agent needs to handle a certain workload
compared to an untrained agent in week d, multiplied by his wage.
Given the decreasing treatment effect over time, we use the actual average per-
formance and actual number of calls made to calculate the returns to training for the
firm. The firm will de facto retain the full benefits of the performance increase because
agents’ wages are almost entirely related to their years of tenure. Figure 4 shows the
estimated curve of cumulated returns
∑D
d=1 Bd until week D. The solid line shows that,
for first-group agents, the cumulated benefits do not exceed the costs of the training in
our sample period. When considering within-team externalities, however, the training
reaches its break-even point in the eighth week after the training.13 Figure 4 shows that
in week 11 after the training, the overall return to the training is 37.7 percent higher when
including externalities in the calculation of the benefits.14
– Figure 4 about here –
4 Additional evidence
4.1 First-week effects
One finding of the preceding analysis of the dynamics of the treatment effect is that
agents perform better only starting from the second week after the treatment (see Figure
3). We can rule out the argument that this is due to selectivity, since over 90 percent of
the agents who participated in the training also worked the following week. Another, yet
13Because half of the training consisted of actual customer calls, we calculated the costs of the training
using 50 percent of the agents’ wage costs. Considering the full wage costs of agents roughly doubles the
training’s costs.
14Externalities were calculated based on the estimates of the treatment effect for the first- and the
second-group agents (τˆ1 and τˆ2) from Columns (2) and (3) of Table 5. We use the difference between
the treatment effects as a measure of externalities. The externality effect on second-group agents is thus
calculated as (τˆ2 − τˆ1) · ahtid · nc,id · wa.
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untestable, explanation for the low effect is that the low performance in the first week
after the training is due to passing knowledge on to teammates.
A testable explanation, however, is fatigue. Most of the agents work part-time, with
an average of about 20 hours per week. The training programme is one full-time week,
that is, 38 hours. When using additional data on previous training programmes, we find
that after rather short training programmes (less than 15 hours of training in one week),
the difference between pre- and post-training is about the same, irrespective of the call
agent’s usual working hours (see Column (1) of Table 6). This is different for long training
programmes where agents with relatively low numbers of working hours perform worse
in the week after the program than before. In contrast, agents with long working hours
do not exhibit this decrease in performance in the first week following the training. This
result suggests that fatigue is an explanation for the slight decrease in performance in the
first week after the training.
– Table 6 about here –
4.2 Personnel turnover and training effects
As in other call centres, the call centre analysed in this study experiences a high agent
turnover. In total, we assigned 86 agents to the treatment and control groups, of which 12
were reassigned by the management or dropped out (see Section 2.3). Table 1 shows that
the treatment and control groups do not differ with respect to observable characteristics
such as age, gender, and tenure. This holds for the initial assignment, as well as for agents
who eventually participated in the training.
Ordinary least squares estimation of Equation (2) results in an unbiased estimator
of τ only if the probability of belonging to either the treatment or control group does
not depend on unobservable characteristics that are correlated with both the likelihood
to participate in the training programme and our performance measure, average handling
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time. This type of selectivity occurs when agents with these characteristics are more likely
to drop out of the treatment group than from out of the control group.
To test this hypothesis, we limit the estimation sample to agents that eventually
participated in the training programme and stayed in the department throughout the
observation period. This decreases the sample size from 74 agents in our main estimation
sample to 55 agents. Of the 34 agents of the treatment group, 26 (77 percent) were
trained and did not leave the call centre. For the control group, this limits the number of
agents from 40 to 29 (73 percent). The main reason for the higher attrition in the control
group is that those agents followed the training several weeks later, which increases the
probability of dropping out before actually participating in the training. Calculating the
attrition rate for treatment group agents who were staying at least until the last week
of our full sample which contains longer panel information, we find there is hardly any
difference in attrition between the treatment and control groups. In addition, we do
not find a systematic pattern in the exit dates that reveals that agents may have left
the department due to the upcoming training.15 Table 7 shows that for this sample the
estimated treatment effect decreases to 7.7 percent, which is lower but not significantly
different from the estimated effect for the main sample (see Column (3) Table of 4).
– Table 7 about here –
4.3 Effects on call quality
Throughout this study, we used a transformation of the average length of calls as a
measure of performance. Average handling time provides a clear measure of performance
that allows us to quantify the returns to training precisely. One can, however, argue
that individual productivity is a function of two dimensions. Calls can differ not only by
15There are potentially two dates on which selective agents may be more likely to leave due to the
training. First, several months ahead of the first training, agents were informed that the whole department
was going to be trained. Second, each agent received her schedule four weeks ahead. At neither of the
two moments did exit rates appear to be higher than usual.
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quantity, but also by quality provided by the agent. In this case, ‘actual’ productivity
y′it = f(yit, y
q
it) is a function of the quantity-performance measure yit and a performance
measure for quality yqit. If y
′
it is a non-monotonic function in yit, improvements in average
handling time will not necessarily translate into higher productivity. Since call quality
is much more difficult to monitor than work speed, agents may aim to improve their
handling times by providing lower call quality. However, agents cannot easily shirk by
delivering low quality with a low average handling time because their calls are regularly
monitored by their team leaders.
To test whether agents substitute higher performance yit by providing lower quality
yqit, we employ an alternative indicator for which we have data for each worker and week:
the share of repeat calls. This measure is defined as the share of customers an agent talked
to who called the call centre again within seven days. The firm uses this measure as an
indicator of call quality because low customer satisfaction with the first call is the main
reason for repeat calls.16 On average, 23.6 percent of the customers called back within
seven days after the first phone call (see Column (1) of Table 1). Because low values of
repeat calls (rcit) indicate higher performance, we define call quality as y
q
it =
1
rcit∗10 , with
an average of 0.454.
The first column of Table 8 shows that training participation does not significantly
affect call quality. The argument that the shorter average handling time after the training
may be associated with lower call quality is therefore not supported by the data.
– Table 8 about here –
Having information on the quality of calls allows us to create a composite measure
of productivity that incorporates both quantity and quality dimensions. We define y′it
as y′it = yit · (1 − rcit). Higher shares of repeat calls rcit can thus be interpreted as a
penalty in performance, since each additional percentage point in the share of repeat calls
16Note that the type (and potentially also the length) of repeat calls can be different from that of initial
calls. Repeat calls are, however, not linked to certain agents. This implies that every agent has a given
probability of receiving repeat calls.
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(lower quality) relates to a lower composite productivity y′it. The second column of Table
8 shows that the estimated treatment effect on the composite measure of productivity is
9.85 percent and statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
In addition to the information on the share of repeat calls, we use data gathered
in a customer survey. Individual calls made by call agents were randomly selected and
evaluated by customers on a scale from 1 (very bad) to 10 (very good). Customers gave
grades on three different dimensions: the ‘knowledge of the agent’ (Grade 1 ), whether the
‘agent understood the question’ (Grade 2 ), and whether the agent had a ‘solution to the
problem’ (Grade 3 ). Because the week t in which the call was made and the corresponding
agent i are known, we are able to match this information to whether the agent was treated
yet or not. The unit of observation for this analysis is thus a single call, and not agent-
week information. Columns (3) through (5) of Table 8 indicate show the estimation
results. They indicate that the training had a positive effect on the agent’s knowledge
and understanding capabilities. However, according to Column (5), the training had no
effect on the agent’s ability to provide a solution to the problem. Despite the fact that
the analysis using customer-survey data is based on a rather small sample, the results
are in line with the previous results showing that quality is not substituted at the cost of
average handling time.
4.4 Heterogeneous treatment effects
The preceding analysis did not consider interaction effects between worker characteristics
and treatment. This section analyses whether an agent’s tenure and number of working
hours affect the size of the estimated treatment effect.
First, more experienced agents may exhibit a different effect from the treatment
compared to less experienced agents. On average, more experienced workers perform
better than less experienced workers. When a ceiling exists in the potential productivity
of call centre agents, less experienced agents have higher potential gains from attending the
training. In contrast, complementarity in human capital acquisition can lead to greater
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effects from participation in training for more experienced agents. Column (1) of Table 9
shows the treatment effect for agents with a tenure below the median tenure in our sample.
Compared to Column (2), which shows regression results for agents with a tenure above
the median, the estimated treatment effect is slightly higher for experienced agents (by
1.7 percentage points). The point estimates, though, are not significantly different from
each other.
– Table 9 about here –
Second, agents with more working hours may experience a different treatment effect
compared to agents with fewer working hours. Column (3) of Table 9 shows that the
interaction effect between the number of working hours and the treatment dummy is
significantly negative. This implies that the training participation of agents with more
working hours has a lower effect on their productivity than the training of agents who
work fewer hours. This result can be explained by either the greater fatigue of agents
with more working hours or the selection of individuals into contracts with lower working
hours based on unobservable characteristics such as ability and motivation. Students, for
instance, may have contracts with shorter average working hours.
5 Conclusions
This study analyses the effect of training participation on worker performance by means
of a field experiment held at a telephone company call centre. Agents had to participate
in a compulsory five-day training programme. We randomly assigned agents to train-
ing groups, thereby generating exogenous variation in training participation. Regression
results show that the performance of agents was about 10 percent better after having
followed the training. This return is much higher than the returns to training found in
studies that attempt to correct for selectivity. This may be explained by the fact that the
effects of training on productivity are much greater than the returns measured by workers’
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wages (Dearden et al. 2006; Konings and Vanormelingen 2010). However, as mentioned
in the introduction, we also expect that returns to training in the call centre sector will
be relatively high because the sector lacks proper vocational education for their core jobs.
Furthermore, we find that the performance increase is not due to lower quality provided
by the worker as indicated by a higher rate of repeat calls. Instead, training participation
has a positive effect on customer ratings on agents’ knowledge and understanding of the
customers’ question.
Moreover, we show that agents who did not participate in the training also improved
their performance through externalities. These indirect effects may arise due to either
knowledge spillover from trained to untrained workers or social pressure. We find that
increasing the share of treated peers by 10 percentage points leads to a 0.51 percent
increase in performance. We show that the effects measured are indeed caused by the
training and not other effects, such as selective labour turnover.
Our finding of externalities in the workplace has important implications for the
estimation of the effects of work-related training on wages using individual data. Even
if estimates properly control for selective training participation, the estimated treatment
effect is likely to be an underestimation of the true treatment effect, because externalities
of training participation increase the productivity of those who have not been trained.
Since the tasks carried out by call agents follow an individual production technology
without team production, these externalities are probably even higher in other sectors of
industry in which team work is more important than in the call centres.
The finding of externalities has important implications for firms’ training strategies.
When the externalities of training participation increase the productivity of workers who
have not been trained, it may be more efficient to design training and the assignment by
internalising the treatment externalities. This does, however, involve important questions
for further research. Are there nonlinearities in the externalities and what is the optimal
share of workers being treated? How and to what extent do externalities propagate further
to other workers?
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A Figures
Figure 1: Overview of the field experiment
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Note: This figure shows the design of the field experiment. The observations start in week 45/2008 and end in week 24/2009.
The assignment to treatment and control groups took place in week 50/2008. Training of the treatment group was held in
the experiment period.
Figure 2: Average performance of the treatment group before and after the training
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Note: This figure shows the average performance of agents in the treatment group in the weeks before and after the training
week (solid line). The dashed lines show the 95 percent confidence interval. The training week is denoted as week 0.
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Figure 3: Development of the treatment effect on performance over time
(a) Average effect
−
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
e
st
im
at
ed
 τ 
fo
r w
ee
k 
x
0 5 10
xth week after training
(b) First training groups only
−
.
1
0
.
1
.
2
e
st
im
at
ed
  τ
 
 
fo
r w
ee
k 
x
0 5 10
xth week after training
Note: This figure shows the estimated treatment effect on performance for each week after the training, controlling for a
linear time trend. Panel (a) shows the estimated treatment effect from a regression including all agents. Panel (b) shows the
treatment effect for first groups only. Week 0 denotes the training week. The dashed lines show the 95 percent confidence
interval estimated from a regression of yit on after-training week dummies.
Figure 4: Estimated payoff (in euros)
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Note: Cumulative payoff for first-group agents (solid line) and first-group agents including externalities on teammates
(dashed line). The horizontal axis shows the individual training costs based on an agent’s wages and the trainer’s and the
team leader’s wage costs (see Section 3.4).
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of teams’ first and second training groups (treatment group
only)
(1) (2) (3)
Agents: First group Second group diff (2)-(3)
Gender .3846 .3810 .0037
(share male agents) (.5064) (.4976)
Age 35.659 33.085 2.575
(10.759) (9.799)
Tenure 3.707 4.297 -.590
(in years) (3.978) (3.784)
Performance (yit) .3687 .3539 .0148
(.0685) (.0843)
Call quality (yqit) .4526 .4972 -.0446
(.0798) (.2269)
Composite productivity (y′it) .2844 .2706 .0139
(.0538) (.0616)
Average working hours 18.539 13.952 4.586
(10.674) (7.743)
Share peak hours .5181 .5783 -.0602
(.2242) (.1720)
Number of agents 13 21
Difference significant at * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; two-sided t test. Standard deviations are shown in
parentheses. Descriptive statistics are calculated before agents were assigned to the training (week 50/2008).
Table 3: Average performance post-treatment period (61 agents)
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment group Control group Difference TG-CG
Average performance (predicted) .4148 .4027 .0122***
(.0143) (.0157)
Number of agents 28 35
Number of observations 296 409
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01; two-sided t test. Standard deviations in parentheses. Predicted performance is
generated from a regression of performance on working hours of agent i in week t plus a linear time trend.
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Table 4: Direct treatment effect
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment dummy .1127*** .1244*** .0882***
(.0295) (.0152) (.0206)
Working hours .0017 -.0012 -.0015
(.0018) (.0010) (.0010)
Share peak hours -.2564*** -.3486*** -.3416***
(.0930) (.0739) (.0749)
Calls per FTE .0002*** .0002** .0001
(.0001) (.0001) (.0001)
Time trend .0023**
(.0009)
Constant -1.0008*** -.8770*** -1.0000***
(.0782) (.0582) (.0888)
Individual fixed effects No Yes Yes
Observations 1859 1859 1859
Number of agents 74 74 74
R2 .0689 .6113 .6165
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Dependent variable: log(yit). All standard errors are clustered at the agent level.
Table 5: Estimation of externalities
(1) (2) (3)
Share of peers treated .0513*
(.0275)
Treatment dummy .0992*** .0675**
(.0213) (.0287)
Constant -1.1772*** -1.0548*** -.9924***
(.0702) (.1042) (.1018)
Individual fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1544 1352 1510
Number of agents 74 53 61
Number of agents (treatment group) 34 13 21
Number of agents (control group) 40 40 40
R2 .5612 .6173 .5894
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Dependent variable: log(yit). All standard errors are clustered at the agent level.
Share of peers treated is calculated as the average share using information on the actual working hours in a specific week.
The sample used for Column (1) is restricted to agents in an untreated state only (treatment dummy=0). Control variables
include working hours, share peak hours, a linear time trend, and calls per FTE. The variable share peak hours is not used
in Column (1).
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Table 6: Pre-/post-differences in performance for other training programmes
(1) (2)
Length of courses short long
Agents with short working hours -.037 -.047***
(.080) (.012)
Number of observations 42 526
Agents with long working hours -.006 -.040
(.012) (.034)
Number of observations 742 64
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The numbers show the differences in yit between the first week after the training
and the week before the training. The calculations are based on a larger data set from the same call centre. Short courses
are defined as courses with less than 15 hours per week. Long courses are defined as courses with more than 25 hours per
week. Short and long working hours are relative to the course length. Standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 7: Estimated treatment effect and estimation samples
Treatment dummy .0773***
(.0214)
Constant -.9934***
(.0993)
Individual fixed effects Yes
Control variables Yes
Observations 1532
Number of agents 55
Number of agents (treatment group) 26
Number of agents (control group) 29
R2 .6178
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Dependent variable: log(yit). All standard errors are clustered at the agent level.
The samples is defined as all agents minus agents dropping out due to selection. Control variables include working hours,
share peak hours, a linear time trend, and calls per FTE.
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Table 8: The effect of training participation on call quality
Outcome log(yqit) log(y
′
it) Grade 1 Grade 2 Grade 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Treatment dummy .0425 .0985*** .8701** 1.5742*** -.4701
(.0391) (.0228) (.3721) (.4439) (.9417)
Constant -.5157*** -1.2132*** 6.0604 3.2397 5.2156
(.1374) (.0876) (3.8802) (3.6075) (5.4162)
Individual fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1730 1730 112 115 107
Number of agents 74 74 14 15 15
R2 .3384 .5763 .0283 .0474 .0405
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. All standard errors are clustered at the agent level. Call quality yqit is measured as
1/(share of repeat calls*10). The composite productivity measure y′it is defined as y
′
it = ahtit ∗ (1− share of repeat calls).
Grades are given on ‘knowledge of agent’ (Grade 1 ), ‘agent understood question’ (Grade 2 ), and ‘solution of the problem’
(Grade 3 ). Grades are given on a scale of 1 (very bad) to 10 (very good). Control variables include working hours, share
peak hours, a linear time trend, and calls per FTE.
Table 9: Direct treatment effect with interaction terms
Sample Below-median tenure Above-median tenure All
(1) (2) (3)
Treatment dummy .0811*** .0977*** .1640***
(.0243) (.0325) (.0378)
Working hours -.0011
(.0011)
Working hours × treatment -.0037***
(.0014)
Constant -1.0476*** -1.0467*** -1.0027***
(.0988) (.1265) (.0872)
Individual fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Control variables Yes Yes Yes
Observations 908 951 1859
Number of agents 36 38 74
R2 .1277 .1779 .1585
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Dependent variable: log(yit). Column (1) and (2) show the baseline regression for
agents with below-median (1) and above-median (2) tenure, respectively. All standard errors are clustered at the agent
level. Control variables include share peak hours, a linear time trend, and calls per FTE.
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